Python Sdk
Toxic Filter Python SDK
#ToxicFilter Python SDK
The official Python client for ToxicFilter.
pip install toxicfilter-sdk
from toxicfilter import Client tf = Client(os.environ["TOXICFILTER_KEY"]) verdict = tf.text("Check this message", locales=["en"], surface="comment", reference="comment_9931") if verdict.blocked: refuse() elif verdict.needs_review: hold(verdict.id, verdict.reasons) else: publish()
Three decisions, not two. review is where the uncertainty is allowed to live: forced to
choose between publishing and deleting, a threshold set safely deletes real posts and one
set kindly publishes the abuse. There is no is_toxic here for the same reason: fifteen
categories collapsed into one boolean is somebody else's policy in your code.
#What it does for you
Retries the right failures and never the wrong one. A 429 or a 5xx is asked again with
a growing wait; QuotaExhausted is not, ever. Those two are constantly confused and the
correct behaviour is opposite: retry a rate limit, stop dead on a quota.
Makes those retries safe. Every call carries an Idempotency-Key, generated per call,
so a request that timed out and is asked again is judged once and billed once.
Waits as long as the service asked, and no longer. A 429 carries retry_after, and
honouring it beats guessing: the service knows when its own window turns over. It is bounded
by max_wait (30 seconds by default) all the same, because a number on the wire should not
decide how long your own call hangs.
from toxicfilter import QuotaExhausted, RateLimited try: verdict = tf.text(comment) except QuotaExhausted as e: # Stop calling. No amount of retrying produces credits. alert(f"out of credits: {e.remaining} left, needed {e.required}, renews {e.renews_at}") except RateLimited: # Already retried, and still too many. Back off properly. ...
#When the model is down
A verdict reached without the model because the provider was failing comes back with
degraded set, and is billed as the cheap call. It is a separate field from used_ai on
purpose: one says the cheap detectors were enough, the other says nobody read it, and only
the first is reassuring. Hold or queue what matters to you when you see it.
#Rules without a policy
Send the line you care about and nothing else is acted on. No stored policy is looked up, and no default of ours is laid underneath.
verdict = tf.text(comment, rules={"thresholds": {"sexual": {"block": 0.7}}})
A category you did not mention still scores and still appears in signals; it just does not
decide anything. policy and rules in the same call is a 422, and so is a name that is
not a real category, subject or lead type: a line that acts on nothing looks exactly like a
line that works.
#The rest of the answer
verdict.redacted # the content with the personal data masked, when you asked verdict.context # repeats, near-duplicates, the actor's record and what it moved verdict.shadow # what a policy you are trialling would have said. Never what happened verdict.facts # noticed, not a finding: a language, an age signal, a fingerprint verdict.degraded # part of the pipeline could not run
redacted is usually worth more than a refusal: throwing a whole comment away because it
carried one phone number throws away everything else the person wrote.
verdict = tf.text(comment, redact=True, actor="user_8812") publish(verdict.redacted or comment)
#Who is writing
Every verdict also carries leads: what kind of lead wrote it, scored per type. Neither a
harm nor a subject, but who is on the other side and what they want.
verdict = tf.conversation(messages, rules={"leads": {"free_work_for_equity": {"block": 0.6}}}) verdict.leads # {"free_work_for_equity": 0.9, "no_budget": 0.7} verdict.lead("sales_pitch") # 0.0 when nothing of that type showed verdict.blocked # True: your rule discarded it
Types: free_work_for_equity, no_budget, unrealistic_expectations, free_consulting,
scope_creep, no_show, sales_pitch, partnership_offer, job_seeker,
student_or_survey, support_request. Send the conversation rather than one message and
everything that person said counts.
#Everything else
tf.email("someone@mailinator.com") tf.name("asdkjhasd") tf.signup(name="Ana", email="ana@example.com", bio="...") tf.image("https://cdn.example.com/photo.jpg") tf.image(base64_or_data_uri) # or the bytes, if you have not published it tf.image_data(open("a.jpg", "rb").read()) # the same thing, said explicitly tf.url("https://bit.ly/3xYz") # one link, judged as a link tf.prompt(what_the_user_typed_into_your_chatbot) # prompt injection, plus everything else # A message with what came before it. A pile-on is thirty people each writing one # ordinary rude sentence, and no classifier reading one of them can see it. tf.conversation([ {"author": "u1", "content": "..."}, {"author": "u2", "content": "..."}, {"author": "u5", "content": "the one being judged"}, ], locales=["es"]) # Many things in one call. One bad item is an item, not a batch. batch = tf.batch([ {"kind": "text", "content": "...", "reference": "c_1"}, {"kind": "image", "url": "...", "reference": "p_2"}, ], ai=False) for index, verdict in batch.verdicts.items(): ... for index, error in batch.failures.items(): ... # A backfill: queued, answered immediately, polled or webhooked. queued = tf.batch_async(ten_thousand_comments) tf.batch_status(queued.id) # A backfill read back a page at a time. A cursor, not an offset: rows appear as workers # finish them, so an offset skips whatever was inserted behind it. page = tf.batch_status(queued.id) while page.has_more: page = tf.batch_status(queued.id, after=page.next_after) # The review queue. queue = tf.records(state="open") tf.resolve(record_id, "approved", moderator="ana@example.com") tf.feedback(record_id, "false_positive") # free, and the only honest measure we have # And what a held verdict has had done to it. verdict = tf.record(record_id) verdict.review_state # open, approved or rejected verdict.resolved_by # your own name for whoever decided verdict.feedback # what you already told us, or None verdict.content # only when your policy keeps it, and only until it expires tf.keys() # prefixes, modes, last use. Never a secret. tf.revoke_key(key_id) # including the one you are calling with. There is no create. tf.usage() # credits, windows, prices. Works at zero credits. tf.ping()
#Webhooks
Your endpoint URL is public. Verify before you act:
from toxicfilter import webhooks event = webhooks.event( request.get_data(), # the RAW body request.headers["X-ToxicFilter-Signature"], os.environ["TOXICFILTER_WEBHOOK_SECRET"], ) if event is None: return "", 400
#Notes
Python 3.9+. No dependencies: the standard library does the HTTP. A client for one
small API is not worth a dependency tree, and pinning requests or httpx is how a client
gets removed from a project. Bring your own by passing anything with a send() as
transport=.
#How this is tested
The suite drives the client through a stub transport and covers the parts a caller cannot see: what is retried, what never is, and that a retry reuses its idempotency key while two separate calls do not.
The API contract itself is pinned on the other side, by the ToxicFilter application's own suite, which runs the PHP client against its real routes. Recorded fixtures would agree with the API on the day they were written and drift silently afterwards.
#Author
Created by Edu Lazaro for ToxicFilter, the moderation API this client speaks to.
#License
The ToxicFilter Python SDK is open-sourced software licensed under the MIT license.